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Abstract
SAFE is a data-centric platform for building multi-domain
networked systems, i.e., systems whose participants are con-
trolled by different principals. Participants make trust deci-
sions by issuing local queries over logic content exchanged
in certificates. The contribution of SAFE is to address a key
barrier to practical use of logical trust: the problem of identi-
fying, gathering, and assembling the certificates that are rel-
evant to each trust decision.
SAFE uses a simple linking abstraction to organize and
share certificates according to scripted primitives that imple-
ment the application’s trust kernel and isolate it from logic
concerns. We show that trust scripting with logical data ex-
change yields compact trust cores for example applications:
federated naming, nested groups and roles, secure IP pre-
fix delegation and routing, attestation-based access control,
and a federated infrastructure-as-a-service system. Linking
allows granular control over dynamic logic content based on
dependency relationships, enabling a logic server to make
secure inferences at high throughput.
1. Introduction
Decentralized trust management (DTM [10]) has a long his-
tory (summarized in §2 and §7). In DTM systems, principals
use a formal language to make statements about one another
and about objects in the system, as the basis for access con-
trol and other trust decisions. DTM systems promise to en-
able rapid construction of a wide range of multi-domain net-
worked systems on a common underlying foundation that is
rigorous, flexible, and verifiable.
Researchers have produced many policy languages and
authorization logics based on DTM principles (§7, §8), but
these systems have seen little real-world practical use due
to various practical challenges. We seek to develop a trust
platform that can make future multi-domain DTM systems
easier to develop and less brittle than today’s systems. The
key challenges are how to integrate the trust language with
applications and how to identify, gather, and update rele-
vant content. While second-generation DTM systems moved
away from procedural policy languages in favor of declara-
tive (logic) languages, applications have important procedu-
ral needs that are specific to how they use the logic.
Our premise is that these needs can be met by a pro-
grammable control layer above a simple trust data plane
based on a standard logic language (Datalog). The control
layer adds scripting primitives to organize logic content and
direct the flow of logic content and queries. It produces and
consumes logic content as certificates, and organizes these
certificates according to the needs of the application.
Our system, SAFE, introduces trust scripts at the trust
control layer and a simple certificate linking abstraction to
organize logic content behind an application-specific trust
API (§2). SAFE stores certificates in a shared key-value
store (e.g., a DHT) indexed by parameterized string labels,
which are hashed to yield self-certifying links. Participants
may pass certificates by reference using their links, link
related certificates to form DAGs, and retrieve certificates by
their labels. A construction procedure integrates linking with
the application’s primitives for delegation and endorsement,
naturally generating DAGs in which each certificate links to
others needed to substantiate it (§3).
This approach enables us to factor DTM concerns out
of the application and allows for richer control over trust
choices without complicating the underlying logic language—
on which the soundness of the trust system depends. At the
same time, the logic language minimizes the need for custom
software, certificate formats, and protocols for each applica-
tion.
We used SAFE to implement trust kernels for example
applications (§4). Experiments with a prototype (§5) show
that trust scripts with certificate linking enable concise im-
plementations. They can also reduce validation and proof
costs by enabling a server to cache and index imported logic
content and to select a tightly bounded subset of its cached
content to use for each query or proof (delegation-driven
context pruning,§6). A logic server may switch between
cached sets to make trust decisions at high throughput. This
combination of high-throughput logic servers and a scalable
certificate repository enables SAFE applications to scale.
2. Background
SAFE is a data-centric platform for building multi-domain
networked systems based on a logical trust data plane. This
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section summarizes security assumptions for the target ap-
plications, then explains the role of logical trust (§2.1) and
the SAFE application model (§2.2).
Systemmodel. Participants of a multi-domain networked
system are software programs controlled by principals (e.g.,
users or enterprises) and interacting via messages on the
network, e.g., using some RPC protocol. Each participant
trusts the others only to the extent provided by its trust pol-
icy, which governs its releases of information and its accep-
tance of incoming requests and assertions from other princi-
pals. Any participant may issue assertions about other par-
ties and/or objects in the system. A trust policy may consider
these statements by other parties in checking compliance.
Security model: assumptions. Each principal wields a
keypair suitable to authenticate its communications. In par-
ticular, we presume in this paper that principals issue their
statements as certificates signed by the issuer. Certificates
have a timestamp and expiration time (TTL); clocks are syn-
chronized tightly enough to use them.
Trust model. Programs and policy interpreters are un-
der each principal’s local control. We presume that princi-
pals use only trustworthy programs, and configure them with
their keypairs: a program speaks with the keypair of a princi-
pal that operates it. A principal may configure its trust poli-
cies locally, embed them in the programs, or import them
from another trusted party. Of course, a program may take
inputs directly from the user to configure the policies, e.g., a
user might use a program to create new objects and specify
who can operate on them.
Threat model. The system protects against disruption by
unfaithful or unauthorized parties injecting messages into
the protocol. SAFE is concerned with the integrity of the
trust policy and supporting infrastructure, which governs ac-
ceptance of assertions and requests from other parties. Par-
ticipants may share policies and certificates voluntarily by
passing them on the network; they are otherwise confiden-
tial, but their privacy is not paramount in this paper.
Examples. Familiar examples of this class of systems
include critical services for a secure Internet, e.g., secure
routing (e.g., Secure BGP or RPKI/BGPSEC), hierarchical
naming (e.g., DNSSEC), and certification hierarchies (CA-
PKI). The RPKI range delegations, BGP route advertise-
ments, DNS name records, and PKI identity bindings are
examples of “assertions” passed within signed certificates.
Trust policies to validate these certificates are integral to
these systems. BGPSEC routers verify that each step in a
network route corresponds to a (transitive) advertisement of
an IP prefix controlled by the origin, and DNSSEC clients
accept name records only from servers that are authorita-
tive for those names according to name delegations from a
globally accepted root principal (a keypair). The standard
CA-PKI trust policy accepts name-key bindings that are en-
dorsed transitively from any locally accepted root Certifying
Authority (CA).
These systems also illustrate local configuration of the
trust policy. Each participant in RPKI/BGPSEC or DNSSEC
has a local administrator who specifies root anchors—the
public keys of the DNS root and of the Regional Internet
Registries (RIRs) that allocate IP address space. Similarly,
users of PKI software import lists of public keys for root
CAs from parties they choose to trust; initial root CA lists are
often embedded in the program itself (e.g., a Web browser).
2.1 Logical Trust
SAFE uses a logic to represent trust data exchanged on the
network (in certificates). Logical trust provides a general and
common language to express trust assertions, such as those
as in the examples above. It also allows us to specify the
trust policies as declarative logic rules that capture the neces-
sary safety relationships among assertions in a concise, pre-
cise, and verifiable way. A participant can apply these logic
rules recursively to create a logical proof that a given certifi-
cate delegation chain (or tree/DAG) is sound and compliant.
For example, §4 describes SAFE script packages for secure
routing and federated naming, modeling the structure of RP-
KI/BGPSEC and DNSSEC compactly using logic.
In logical trust systems, each participant uses a local in-
terpreter and logical inference procedure (a prover) to check
boolean-valued guard conditions for trust or access by issu-
ing a logic query against a set of relevant statements (a con-
text) that includes logical rules and facts asserted by other
parties; a participant that checks a guard is an authorizer. In
this way authorization is naturally end-to-end [19].
SAFE addresses support for logical trust as a systems
problem, independent of the logic language in use. Its con-
cepts (§3) apply to any declarative trust language that sup-
ports trust delegation among concretely named principals.
However, we advocate use of pure Datalog, a well-studied
declarative Prolog subset with a rigorous semantics [14], to
represent trust content and trust policies. (See §8.1 for a
rationale.) Our prototype uses an off-the-shelf open-source
embedded interpreter called Styla as its Datalog prover.
“Says” operator. Styla’s namespace feature offers a con-
venient syntax for the classical says operator introduced in
BAN logic [12]. The says operator enables direct use of Dat-
alog as a modal logic of belief and attribution (a trust logic),
following Binder [16]. In our usage of Datalog as a trust
logic, each atomic statement (atom) has a prefix parameter
that represents a principal who says it (the speaker). The
prover tracks the source (speaker) of each assertion or belief
across inference. Policy rules consider the source in draw-
ing inferences: a policy accepts and considers a statement S
only if it has a rule with a matching goal atom that confers
trust in the speaker of S.
Logical trust on the network. All statements in a cer-
tificate must have a speaker that matches the certificate’s is-
suer, or else the certificate is invalid. In this paper all prin-
cipal IDs are hashes of the principal’s public key, follow-
ing SPKI/SDSI [17]. These IDs are used as constants in the
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Figure 1: Linked logic sets in a shared certificate store in a typical usage scenario. A requester passes a reference to a linked certificate DAG in an
authenticated request. The authorizer uses the certificates to check that the requester’s principalID is authorized for the request in compliance with
the authorizer’s trust policy.
logic: e.g., the value of a speaker is a principal ID, which is
checked against the public key of the issuer who signed the
certificate. The hash function—SHA-256 in our prototype—
is presumed to be cryptographically secure. SAFE extends
this idea to self-certifying object IDs: see §3 and Table 1.
We do not assume any PKI infrastructure to distribute
public keys: all common trust anchors and key endorsements
are defined within the application. For example, any princi-
pal P may issue any assertion about another principal Q as
a logic statement: is spoken by P and names Q’s principal
ID (key hash) as a parameter, and is passed in a certificate
signed by P . A receiver of the statement validates its au-
thenticity before accepting it into a proof context. Its prover
then considers the statement according to the policy rules in
the context. In this way logical trust extends conventional
identity-based PKI security to incorporate rich statements
about principals and their security attributes, and avoids the
need for a global root anchor—although an application may
choose to use one.
2.2 Building Systems with SAFE
An application of SAFE is a set of software programs that
the principals deploy and use to act within the system.
Development model. Developers may write programs in
any language, but use SAFE’s scripting language (§3) to
implement the trust kernel of the application as a module
comprising a set of trust scripts. The trust module presents
an application-specific API to the rest of the program, with
a method for each trust-related event or action. The program
invokes its trust API in response to incoming requests, user
actions, or other events.
The trust scripts hide details of the trust implementation.
They handle all details of generating, sharing, and process-
ing certificates and their logic content, using the SAFE ab-
stractions described in §3. Developers of trust scripts and
policies must understand SAFE and its logic, but ordinary
application developers see only the trust API, and users see
only the application’s external interface.
Evolution.Multi-domain networked systems evolve over
time as principals join or leave and act according to their
policies. Their trust scripts may generate and/or adopt new
keypairs, issue certificates under their keypairs, withdraw or
modify previously issued certificates, or retrieve certificates
issued by other parties and interpret their content according
to local trust policy rules. An invoked script may import new
trust content (facts or policy rules) on the fly as data, e.g.,
from a file or from the network. In this way the policies and
trust structure may evolve over time without modifying the
software itself.
Shared vocabulary. To exchange trust data, principals
must agree on a vocabulary of logic symbols (predicates and
constants) and their meaning. A simple way to assure com-
mon conventions is for everyone to run the same (or compat-
ible) trust scripts. Importantly, it is not dangerous for a prin-
cipal to adopt incompatible or unfaithful trust scripts. The
integrity of a SAFE system does not rely on the trust scripts,
but on the soundness of the underlying logic. If a principal
adopts malicious scripts it may harm itself and others who
choose to trust it, but it cannot subvert the system.
Trusted Computing Base. Each principal’s TCB in-
cludes its prover, script interpreter, and scripts, which are
all under its direct control. Each principal must trust its own
scripts, since they may issue certificates under the princi-
pal’s keypair, and they also control how it validates, ac-
cepts, and interprets the certificates it receives from others.
We emphasize that certificates never contain scripting, but
only declarative logic content attributed to an authenticated
speaker (with says).
3. Linked Logic Sets
The SAFE platform offers new abstractions and system sup-
port to simplify construction of multi-domain networked
systems using trust logic, and to assure good performance
for logic operations by careful management of proof con-
texts. Its novelty lies in a linked logic set abstraction, set-
oriented scripting, and programmatic control of linking and
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context assembly within the trust scripts. Certificates are
shared by posting them to a shared certificate repository and
passing them by reference. (See Figure 1.)
Abstraction: sets, labels, and linking. SAFE introduces
an abstraction of linked logic sets. A logic set is an authenti-
cated set of declarative trust logic statements gathered from
one or more issuers. Every SAFE certificate encapsulates a
logic set: the semantic content of a SAFE certificate is a
set of logic statements authenticated to the certificate’s is-
suer. SAFE certificates may also contain links, which are
self-certifying references to other certificates, possibly from
other issuers. The closure of a certificate is a logic set result-
ing from the union of the content of that certificate and of its
linked descendants in the certificate DAG.
Certificate storage and retrieval. The issuer of a SAFE
certificate names it with an arbitrary string label that is
unique among all certificates issued by that principal. A
link is a hash of the target certificate’s label and its issuer’s
public key. Anyone can fetch a certificate given its link.
Our prototype stores certificates indexed by their links in
a shared key-value store. Prior research has shown how to
implement key-value storage in a reliable and scalable way
(e.g., as a DHT); §8 discusses issues for the certificate/store
infrastructure.
Scripting primitives for logic sets. Trust scripts use
builtin scripting primitives to create logic sets from param-
eterized templates, link them to other sets, materialize them
as certificates, fetch and combine links and closures, and
issue logic queries against unions of link closures.
Links serve as a general indexing technique for stored
certificates. A script can synthesize a link given knowledge
of the issuer’s public key hash, its label conventions, and
any parameters in the label. In effect, the model supports
simple exact queries for certificates by synthesizing the link
from a unique tuple of string values interpolated in a known
label template. Some SAFE applications merely follow link
trails left by issuers, but others synthesize links from shared
conventions for label and logic templates embodied in the
trust scripts.
3.1 Slang Scripting
We found it convenient to implement the scripting language
with a separate interpreter, rather than embedding it in a
general-purpose programming language. We refer to it as
SAFE language or slang. We present slang details only as
needed to illustrate the concepts of trust scripts.
Slang offers a simple functional model with recursion
but no looping. The only data types are strings and named
logic sets. It adds set-oriented scripting features to a logic
interpreter core: functional rules that return values; logic
sets as first-class entities; parameterized set constructor tem-
plates (defcon rules); template-based context assembly
(defguard rules); programmable invocation of the prover to
issue logic queries against assembled contexts; and an exten-
sible library of useful builtins (see Table 2). Slang supports
Constant type Description
<predicate> A boolean-valued function, e.g.,
evil(mallory).
<principalID> A secure principalID is a hash of the princi-
pal’s public key.
<objectID> A self-certifying identifer (scid) is the princi-
palID of the object’s controlling authority con-
catenated with an identifier chosen by the au-
thority (e.g., an RFC 4122 GUID). The builtin
rootID(scid) returns a scid’s principalID.
<pathname> A sequence of components separated by /, op-
tionally prefixed with the principalID of the
naming root (like SPKI/SDSI names). Exam-
ple: bob:a/b/c.
<IP range> A standard IPv4 prefix/range descriptor, e.g.,
ipv4"152.3.136.0/24".
<value> Values are strings or numbers.
Table 1: Term constants for trust logic content, including conventions
for self-certifying IDs and pathnames supported by slang to generate
and query logic content. The meanings of constants are user-defined: if
A has a policy rule with a goal atom that matches an assertion said by
B, then A accepts B’s meaning for constants in that assertion.
Function Description
post Post a set as a certificate and return its token.
scid Generate a self-certifying identifier (scid) for a
new object, for use as a term constant.
principalID Return principal ID (a key hash) for a public key.
rootID Given a scid, return the principal ID of its con-
trolling principal.
{...} Set template: return a set formed by interpolating
slang variables in the templated logic.
link In a set template, add a link to another set.
label In a set template, identify the set by a string label.
splitHead Return the first component of a pathname.
splitTail Return pathname with head stripped off.
tokenFromLabel Given a set label and principalID, return its token.
Table 2: Selected slang builtins for use by trust scripts.
ordinary rule variables and also environment variables that
are scoped to a slang interpreter thread, e.g., for command
line arguments or script request parameters.
Objects and scids. Slang builtins support useful con-
ventions for term constants in the underlying logic, includ-
ing self-certifying pathnames IDs for principals and objects
(Table 1). In particular, it supports self-certifying identifiers
(scids) for “global” objects. The name of a global object
is securely bound to some principal (its controlling author-
ity) who controls the name. Scripts use a builtin function
to generate scids, and the rootID builtin returns a scid’s
controlling principalID (Table 2). Self-certifying IDs ensure
that parties have distinct names for their objects, and a ma-
licious principal cannot “hijack” another’s names: the BAN
controls relation [12] is clearly defined.
3.2 Set Storage: Certificates and Tokens
If a script exports (posts) a locally constructed logic set,
the slang runtime materializes it as a SAFE certificate au-
thenticated to the issuer. It records the issuer’s principalID
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($Self) as the speaker of each statement, and signs it under
the keypair for $Self. The slang runtime writes a posted
certificate to the shared certificate store (§5) indexed by a
token that is globally unique and secure.
Secure tokens. A token acts as a secure link: a certificate
is accessible to any client that knows its token, but only
the issuer can post to the token or modify the certificate.
SAFE generates a token for a posted logic set by hashing the
principalID $Self with the set’s string label, which must
be unique among all sets controlled by the principal. Thus
tokens are self-certifying and cryptographically unforgeable.
ID sets and identity certificates. By convention every
principal posts an identity/ID set (equivalent to a self-signed
identity certificate) containing its full public key under a null
label, such that its token is the key hash (principalID) itself.
SAFE uses the principalID directly as a token to fetch the
ID set when the full key is needed to validate signatures of
certificates issued by the principal. This convention enables
use of compact key hashes as principal names.
Similarly, an object’s controlling authority may post an
ID set for the object under a token computed directly from
the object ID (scid). An object’s ID set is an object credential
containing facts and/or policy rules about the object.
3.3 Set Linking
Secure tokens and the SafeSets certificate store enable par-
ticipants to pass sets by reference, fetch them on demand,
and cache them after validation (§5), indexed by their tokens.
They also enable flexible certificate linking: if a posted set
contains links, their targets are embedded in the certificate as
tokens. Each token t references a unique certificate ct and a
logic set containing the logic content of ct and its closure—
the content of the certificates linked transitively from ct. The
linked certificates form a DAG: fetches ignore any links that
result in cycles.
Thus the construction of linked certificate DAGs is dis-
tributed across the participants who issue and receive them
as credentials—sets/certificates containing endorsements
and delegations. It is based on two principles: 1. The ex-
plicit delegation rule requires that each participant collects
and stores its received credentials by linking them into cre-
dential sets that it maintains. 2. The support rule requires
that the issuer of any new credential links it to any of its own
credential sets that support its authority to issue the creden-
tial. If all issuers follow these rules then by induction the
transitive closure of any credential contains the totality of
upstream credentials needed to validate it—its support set.
Credential sets are also used at request time: a client
passes a credential set token to a server (as $BearerRef)
to substantiate an access request. These credential sets may
contain a superset of what is required to support an endorse-
ment or a request: the authorizer’s prover extracts the rele-
vant statements. A simple convention is that all participants
maintain a subject set with a standard label for use to sub-
stantiate their requests and issued credentials.
3.4 Guards and Context Assembly
An authorizer’s guard policies use logic rules to validate all
credentials and delegations and verify that they are rooted in
accepted trust anchors and compliant with the trust policy.
Linking is also useful to assemble contexts for these autho-
rization queries. Different trust decisions by the same princi-
pal may reason from different contexts. To this end, the slang
runtime assembles the proof context for a query from one or
more sets, each referenced by a link in a set template in the
guard policy’s defguard rule. With this structure an autho-
rizer can obtain all credentials needed for a query by link-
ing tokens into the proof context, then “pulling” and caching
their closures.
Summary. SAFE generalizes certificate chaining to sup-
port DAGs. The DAGs are collaboratively editable: each cer-
tificate is controlled by its issuer, and changes by its issuer
become visible in any sets that link to it. The links and com-
mon repository enable a guard policy to identify and obtain
the certificates that are relevant to a particular trust query,
and exclude others, keeping the context small for efficient
queries (delegation-driven context pruning). While logic set
linking and certificate chaining can be beneficial in other set-
tings as well, the combination of linked certificate DAGs and
trust logic is uniquely powerful. Trust scripts express an ap-
plication’s linking structure concisely, integrated with its use
of the logic.
4. Example Applications
We contend that SAFE’s abstraction of linked logic sets en-
ables us to specify and implement multi-domain systems in a
compact, flexible, and efficient way on a common platform.
To evaluate SAFE we implemented some exemplary appli-
cations. These are script packages of common elements that
may be combined in larger applications. Each of them illus-
trates different aspects of trust solutions using logic, script-
ing, and linking. Table 3 summarizes the applications and
their complexity.
STRONG implements secure symbolic pathnames and
nested groups with roles and delegatable membership. Prin-
cipals issue symbolic names for principals or objects, includ-
ing naming contexts of other principals. Pathname lookup
is relative to a specified naming root anchor, which may
be a shared naming root as in DNSSEC. Principals create
groups and grant membership in them to principals or other
groups, with optional named roles. Principals may also de-
fine groups and delegate nested group memberships within
a federated space of named groups, as in SPKI/SDSI and
SFS [22]. Groups may be used as roles or tags, e.g., in object
ACLs. The combination of groups and names is equivalent to
SPKI/SDSI [15, 17], with some differences: e.g., SPKI/SDSI
groups are names, while STRONG groups are objects, which
may have names). STRONG offers key elements of Ama-
zon’s Identity and AccessManagement (AWS-IAM [4]), and
extends it to a multi-domain system. It adds a wildcard fea-
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Application #Predicates #Policy
rules
#Assertion
types
#Guard
APIs
#LoC #LoL Description
STRONG:
naming &
groups
14 10 17 5 201 79 Groups with nesting, roles, objects and ACLs,
nested groups, secure symbolic pathnames
GENI 26 28 24 3 293 143 Trust core for federated IaaS (NSF
GENI [11]).
Routing 5 5 11 2 95 41 Secure prefix delegation (e.g., RPKI) and route
advertisements (e.g., BGPSEC)
Attestation 11 4 8 2 103 43 Secure code identity, code attestation chains,
image properties, attestation-based access
control for principal ID or IP address.
Table 3: Example applications built on SAFE and their complexity: trust script APIs, lines of scripting code, and the number of lines of logic
templates (LoL).
ture from AWS-IAM to grant access for all objects with
names matching a pathname prefix.
GENI is the trust core of NSF GENI [9], a federated
Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) testbed. GENI’s trust sys-
tem extends the Slice Facility Architecture of PlanetLab
(see [35]) as described in [11]. GENI serves as a full-
featured network trust example that includes global objects
(projects and slices: [11], §2.1) with hybrid capability-based
access control, multiple object authorities ([11], §2.2), and
a root trust anchor that endorses the authorities and member
sites for a federation.
Routing implements secure IPv4 prefix delegation and
routing: it checks the security of route advertisements (fol-
lowing an example in [38]) and prefix ownership. We added
builtins to slang and Styla to manipulate IPv4 prefix types
and verify membership and containment.
Attestation implements access control based on attesta-
tion of the code running on a client and properties of the
code. A guard checks whether the code (image) running on
a client can access a given object, based on an object ACL
that lists properties of permitted image. The trust policy per-
mits the access if the client is attested (e.g., by a trusted cloud
provider) to be running a given image, and the image is en-
dorsed as having a permitted property (e.g., by a trusted cer-
tification authority).
Figure 2 illustrates how the trust scripts for these applica-
tions link sets to according to the delegation patterns.
Datalog is sufficiently powerful to represent common fea-
tures for trust and access control used in these examples.
User-defined predicates may represent properties, attributes,
roles, relationships, rights, powers, or permissions. An ap-
plication can use its vocabulary of predicates and constants
to represent common forms of restricted delegation: names,
capabilities, endorsement/attestation chains, address range
allocation, route advertisements. Each delegation is con-
strained by a predicate and its parameters, including the re-
ceiving principal (delegate) and other qualifiers such as an
object name (e.g., “Alice owns file F”). Thus simple logic
assertions can capture hierarchical naming, nested groups,
named roles and other attribute assertions, ACLs, capabili-
ties, and authority over ranges (e.g., IP prefixes). Declarative
policy rules capture the conditions to validate these asser-
tions. Conjunctive policy rules permit reasoning from multi-
ple attributes of a principal or object. Policy rules are mobile:
they may be passed in certificates.
Example: capabilities. Both STRONG and GENI sup-
port capabilities—transitive delegations for rights over ob-
jects, e.g., for membership in groups and projects and ac-
cess to slices. Capabilities are represented as logic certifi-
cates that grant a named principal a specific named right over
an object named by an ID. The named holder may in turn
delegate the capability to others, in compliance with other
applicable policies of the object’s controlling authority. Del-
egations may refine the delegated rights, or restrict further
delegation.
Listing 1: Policy rule for capability-based access control.
1 defcon capabilityRule() :- {
2 cap(?Subject, ?Object, ?Priv, ?Delegatable) :-
3 ?Delegator: delegateCap(?Subject, ?Object, ?Priv, ?Delegatable),
4 cap(?Delegator, ?Object, ?Priv, true).
5 }.
The meaning of capability-based access control is easily
captured in a recursive logic policy rule (Listing 1). It says
that a delegate (Subject, a principalID) has a capability
for privilege Priv over Object (a scid) if another principal
(Delegator) has issued the capability, and the Delegator
itself possesses the capability and is empowered to delegate
it. The rule supports confinement: each Delegator speci-
fies whether its delegate may pass the capability on to others.
Set linking for capabilities. In the scripts, a principal
links its capabilities for an object into a capability set for
that object. The capability set is an example of a credential
set. If it delegates a capability, it issues a new set with a
cap statement, links it to its own capability set and subject
set, and passes its token to the delegate. Transitively, any
capability token links the full delegation chain to validate it
according to the policy rule.
Pathname resolution in STRONG is enabled by both
scripting and set linking. Although logic can represent the
structure of the name space, logic cannot resolve names: the
entire context for a logic query is present at query time, so
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Figure 2: Set linking examples. For nested groups, links traverse group delegation and membership delegation backwards; for hierarchical names,
links traverse delegation of sub-name spaces and policies on the object hierarchy; in GENI, links traverse delegation of projects and slices, and the
endorsement by each layer’s authority. Secure routing links to the IP prefix allocations and route advertisements needed to substantiate each route
update.
it does not block. Therefore, logic itself cannot fetch the
name entries for each component in sequence. Instead, a
logic script fetches the name set for each component by
synthesizing its token from a standard set label (parame-
terized with the name) and the principalID of its parent
domain. The script uses a logic query to extract match-
ing name assertions from a name set to target the next
fetch. Once the name sets for all components are present,
the script invokes logic to validate the path end-to-end.
CoDoNS [31] uses a DHT to resolve names in a similar
way, and STRONG’s validation step is exactly the certified
evaluation of SD3 [21]. These works explore secure nam-
ing in the context of DNSSEC; STRONG generalizes these
approaches to multi-rooted linked local names as in SPKI/S-
DSI.
5. Implementation
SAFE is implemented in about 9000 lines of Scala code,
with Styla as an open-source Datalog engine. SAFE runs
as an interpreter with one or more slang programs (logic
scripts) loaded into it. The behavior of a script is determined
in part by the logic content passed to it: participants may add
new rules to evolve the policies or tailor them to local needs
without changing the scripts. Scripts are composable: it is
easy to add code to customize the local behavior. Changing
the scripts does not affect other software and state at the site.
The interpreter is stateless (except for the caches): it may
restart and/or reload scripts at any time.
Certificate handling. Applications invoke the script en-
try points to handle trust-related events, e.g., checking ac-
cess or issuing endorsements, delegations, or policy rules.
The runtime system handles generation of certificates (in a
native SAFE format) and tokens and related cryptographic
operations automatically and transparently. It also handles
post/fetch operations on the certificate store: it performs
cycle-safe recursive fetches and parallelizes them using a
thread pool (futures) to reduce latency.
The certificate store is a generic key-value store (we
use Riak [32] in our experiments) with added write access
checks (below): it verifies that the issuer of a post on a to-
ken uses a keypair whose public key yields the token when
hashed (SHA-256) with the label. We refer to the store as
“SafeSets”.
Set caches. Logic sets created in slang or fetched from
the store are cached in an in-memory set cache; fetch checks
the cache for each subset token encountered during a re-
cursive fetch. When a context is assembled for dispatch to
the inference engine, SAFE renders it to an internal con-
text format required by the Styla engine. We supplemented
the context format and access procedures in Styla to add a
secondary index to access statements by head predicate and
first parameter, which we found important for to speed up the
search for statements matching a goal in processing the del-
egation chains that are common in trust logic (§6). Contexts
are cached in a context cache.
The caches store only fresh authenticated logic content,
to assure the validity of logic content passed to the proof en-
gine. Logic content expires from the cache at the expiration
time of the containing certificate. A cached context expires
at the earliest expiration time of any statement it contains.
Currently there is no result caching.
Deployment. SAFE may run in the same JVM as the ap-
plication, e.g., to implement command-line tools. A SAFE
instance can also be configured to export script entry points
through a generic REST API. This deployment model facil-
itates cross-language interoperability: an application server
(e.g., a GENI control server) invokes its scripts over a secure
channel to a separate SAFE process, which holds its signing
key. (See Figure 3). The app server may use any language, as
long as it can make REST calls. When a request enters the
app server, it invokes SAFE to evaluate a matching guard,
passing a list of string-valued parameters named in the re-
quest, including the subject’s principalID and a credential
token ($BearerRef). If the guard returns false, the server
denies the operation.
The explicit delegation rule requires that issuers must
pass tokens to notify a recipient of an issued credential;
the recipient then invokes a script to add the link to a cre-
dential set. Currently, this passing of tokens must occur in
an application-layer protocol. Tokens are base64-encoded
strings that may be passed via web or e-mail.
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Figure 3: Server access control using SAFE. A SAFE instance runs as a separate process with loaded trust scripts (in slang) and the principal’s signing key
($Self) and local policy rules. The server application invokes its scripts through a REST API. Credentials are passed as references to signed logic sets in a
shared store (SafeSets). The SAFE process fetches sets on demand, validates them, and caches their logic content for use by the prover. Shaded components
are application independent.
SafeSets. SAFE can also act as an access-control proxy
(a shim) in front of the app service. SafeSets is itself imple-
mented as a SAFE instance running as an HTTP/REST inter-
ception proxy to an unmodified Riak key/value store [32]. A
slang program in the shim guards access for Riak put opera-
tions (post). It accesses operands of the request using slang
builtins for SAFE’s certificate format. It validates that the
post token (the Riak key) is derived from a hash of the signed
string label and the requester’s public key.
The issuer’s scripts control the lifetime of a certificate by
setting its expiration date as a meta-predicate in the construc-
tor. In addition, the issuer/owner may revoke a certificate
early or reissue an updated certificate under the same token.
6. Evaluation
We run SAFE and application trust scripts (§4) on a cluster
with multiple SAFE instances representing multiple princi-
pals in a multi-domain system, and subjecting them to re-
quest workloads through the REST API. For this evaluation
the REST calls originate from a load generator harness. It
generates script requests according to a synthetic mix, and
maintains lists of principals (keypairs) and objects in var-
ious states to select from (randomly) as operands. We use
this setup to evaluate four central points:
1. Scripted set linking enables fast automated retrieval
of the relevant logic content for each query or authoriza-
tion decision. The application trust scripts handle all linking
and access checks required for their policies. The linked cer-
tificate DAGs flow naturally from delegation patterns in the
request mix.
2. Caching reduces the costs to pull and validate signed
sets. Commonly accessed logic content tends to reside in
caches. In GENI the cached portions of the DAGs include
the base trust structure, with endorsements of authority
servers from the federation root, and packages of access pol-
icy rules from the qualified authority servers. In STRONG it
includes portions of pathname trees close to their roots. The
cache also captures repeated accesses.
3. Scripted linking enables lightweight queries and trade-
offs between policy flexibility and cost. A core design prin-
ciple of SAFE is to limit context size by including only the
logic relevant to each guard query. Linked certificate DAGs
can substantially reduce query cost by focusing the prover
on the statements of interest: delegation-driven context prun-
ing. In practice, script developers have a continuum of link-
ing choices balancing various goals, but these choices are
made in advance of query time, at delegation time—they are
in essence pre-materialized views over the global set of cre-
dentials.
4. Programmable linked contexts enable practical high-
throughput logic servers. Linking in guards enables a logic
server to switch between contexts for logic queries. Each
context includes linked closures selected for the needs of the
specific query; linked pruning excludes superfluous state-
ments from the context, reducing proof costs. The secondary
index in the prover (§5) enables it to assemble proofs in time
linear with the length of delegation chains, which occur fre-
quently in trust logic. Some policies show nonlinear proof
costs when the prover is forced to explore each branch of a
disjunction (e.g., an ACL), but this cost scales with the com-
plexity of the authorizer’s policy.
Each SAFE instance runs on a four-core KVM (Intel
Xeon CPU E5520 @ 2.27GHz) with 12 GB of RAM and
1Gb/s Ethernet. The SafeSets cluster is five similar VMs
running Riak 2.1.4 [32] with a replication degree N =
3 and R = 1, W = 3. Each logic set is materialized
as a certificate with a 2048-bit RSA signature; their logic
payloads range from 467-840 Unicode characters. Tokens
and principal IDs are self-certifying 256-bit SHA hashes
(32-byte base64-encoded).
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(a) Direct linking. With a hot cache this mix sustains 2754 authz-
ops/sec under load with median latency of 670 µs.
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(b) Coarse-grained linking. Poor context pruning leads to long
tail latency. With a hot cache this mix sustains 2538 ops/sec with
median latency 731 µs.
Figure 4: End-to-end latency profile of queries for a delegation-rich GENI scenario (query-only, concurrency level 12).
Direct Coarse
#sets in context (95%) 36 192
#stmts in context (95%) 54 245
Fetch closure (95%) 184 ms 298 ms
Table 4: Effect of linking granularity on the latency of closure fetches
for the example of Figure 4. Latency is measured on a SAFE instance
with a warm cache (round 50). Direct linking reduces closure sizes (via
better context pruning) and tail latency for closure fetches. SAFE’s
parallel closure fetches mitigate the higher tail latency for coarse-
grained linking.
Authorization cost with set linking. We first explore
the cost for a participant to check trust compliance in a
large system—one with a large number of principals and
credentials—under alternative set linking structures. We use
a GENI mix to check access to slice objects for user requests.
The policy checks that a slice is endorsed by an authority,
that it is bound to a project endorsed by an authority, that
the authorities are endorsed by the federation, and that the
user has received delegated capabilities for the project and
slice by a chain rooted in their owners. It checks against a
pre-constituted certificate set with 1M users, 100K project
groups and slice objects, and 500K random delegations:
the delegation chains are longer than is likely to occur in
practice.
Figure 4 shows the latency profile for processing and
fetch costs for a server to check and approve random allow-
able requests. The experiments start with cold cache, and
random requests are issued in rounds of 1000: the graphs
plot latencies for selected rounds to show the effect of cache
warming. As the caches warm, latencies drop and fewer re-
quests show long latencies due to misses and context assem-
bly. The caches are sufficiently large to avoid eviction for
this workload. The hot results show the in-server processing
costs. All other costs are driven by certificate fetches: with a
scalable K/V deployment this system could scale to a large
number of issuers and authorizers.
Effect of set linking choices. Figure 4 also shows that
linking conventions in the scripts can have a substantial im-
pact on context size and proof costs. Linking is coarse-
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Figure 5: Context size (number of sets) for the example of Figure 4.
Coarse-grained linking using subject sets is simple, but it produces
large contexts in this delegation-rich scenario. Logic scripts with direct
linking maintain multiple credential sets and exclude irrelevant sets
(delegation-driven context pruning).
grained (right graph) when it follows the simple convention
in §3.3: each principal maintains a single credential set (sub-
ject set) for received delegations, and links it as the support
set for all issued delegations. Linking is direct (left graph)
when a principal’s subject set includes only its identity cre-
dentials (e.g., a principal’s attribute endorsements); received
delegations are maintained in separate credential sets, and
each request or delegation links only to the subject set and
selected credential sets needed to substantiate it. Direct link-
ing requires a 19-line change in the GENI scripts. It yields
a substantial improvement in delegation-rich scenarios: with
coarse-grained linking, the delegator links each delegation to
its subject set, which links to many irrelevant received dele-
gations. Table 4 and Figure 5 show that direct linking prunes
context more effectively, reducing fetch costs, improving
cache effectiveness (as shown by comparing the warm Fig-
ure 4 curves), and reducing query costs (as shown by com-
paring the Figure 4 hot curves).
Cache updates. SAFE uses a simple policy to handle
updates to credential sets in the cache. Figure 6 continues
the GENI scenario with 40K principals, but adds new del-
egations to the query mix. These results use direct linking
for delegations, but the client passes its subject set as the
$BearerRef to substantiate a request. When the cache is
hot, an update-then-query sequence (e.g., new delegateS-
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Figure 6: Latency profile under a mix of queries and certificate
updates on a cluster. The workload is under the GENI scenario but
adds random update-then-query sequences (new projects/slices and
delegations) to the mix. The target server serves queries with a hot
cache. Certificate updates to SafeSets are sent to other servers in the
cluster, which lead to failed inference on the target server that need
the new delegations. The update-then-query sequences constitute 40%
operations in the mix, among which 25% updates are delegations each
of which immediately follows a predecessor update issued from the
same harness thread and is made to the same subject. The results show
the latency of each query on the target server and the latency of each
update collected from the cluster. The query latency results show a
spike for the resulting failed inference and invalidation/refresh of the
cached context and its sets under updates and another spike for the
delayed cache refreshes.
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Figure 7: Comparison of inference cost for group delegation between
noisy and compact contexts, with primary and secondary indexing
schemes. The baseline delegation chain contains 1 group membership
and 5 membership delegations.
lice, then update capability set, then sliceOperation such as
createSliver) results in a failed authorization, because the
cached subject set does not reflect the new object and del-
egation. In this case, SAFE invalidates and refreshes all sets
in the context, and then repeats the guard query. To avoid a
denial of service attack it adds a variable throttle delay of
up to one second before the cached context or sets can be
refreshed again (in addition to an optional limit on the num-
ber of statements or sets in a context). Figure 6 shows the
latency of the update operations and also the failed queries
and context reload.
Context pruning and indexing. Certificate linking and
delegation-driven proving can also improve the efficiency
of logic inference substantially. We show this effect for
nested groups (Figure 7) and named objects (Figure 8) in
the STRONG group service and naming service respec-
tively. The structure of group delegations creates a hazard
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Figure 8: Comparison of inference cost for name entry delegation,
between noisy and compact contexts, with primary and secondary in-
dexing schemes.
for a prover trying to answer an access query: is principal P
a member of group G? If membership in G is delegated to
multiple subgroups, recursively, then the prover may explore
the subgroup closure searching for a subgroup that includes
P . In SAFE, these superfluous delegations are pruned, be-
cause they are not reachable in the link closure of principal
P ’s BearerRef. That is P does not link any of its creden-
tial sets to them, because there is no associated delegation of
interest to P .
We show the impact of linked pruning on the inference
using noisy contexts with superfluous delegations. The link-
ing patterns in the scripts prune these superfluous delega-
tions, so a SAFE prover would not see them in real opera-
tion. In a noisy context, we inject the distracting delegations
as a binary tree and set the tree height to the length of the
delegation chain (given by the x-axis). We conducted similar
experiments with the same methodology for subgroup dele-
gation (Figure 7) in the group service and for sub-namespace
delegation (Figure 8) in the name service; in the naming ex-
ample, to distract the inference we add a name entry delega-
tion tree under the root naming object that has been attached
access policies as ACLs. The query checks whether a tar-
get object is under the root naming object; the height of the
noisy delegation tree is set equal to the length of the path-
name (given by the x-axis).
For both examples, the noisy contexts lead to exponential
proof costs. In contrast, the proof cost is always linear in the
length of the delegation chain for the pruned context in con-
junction with the secondary index. In the group example, the
prover explores it by applying group delegation rules back-
wards recursively from the root, and at each step it knows
the containing group that it is looking for (initially it is G).
The primary index indexes on the goal’s predicate name and
argument count, but the secondary index includes this first
argument. It takes time linear in the number of facts to build
the secondary index for a context, but once it is present the
desired fact is extracted from the context in constant time.
The trust scripts choose the order of parameters to ground
facts representing delegations to enable effective indexing
with the secondary index.
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Figure 9: Latency of bulk name lookups with caching. As the client’s
set cache warms, lookups speed up as the interior of the naming tree is
cached. On a hot cache, resolution of a leaf name takes 13.3 ms (95%).
Operation latency
Post
sign/issue 8.0 ms
post data 3.9 ms
post validation 322 µs
script processing 13.4 ms
Fetch set
fetch 3.2 ms
verify signature 294 µs
parsing 3.2 ms
Name validation (CE) 134 µs
Lookup processing (one hop) 30 µs
Table 5: Breakdown of operation latency (95%) in naming service, to
issue authenticated names (post) and resolve a pathname component
(fetch/verify/parse). “Script processing” includes all other costs.
Latency and caching in the naming service. Pathname
lookups are a different case because the client trust script
must parse the pathname, extract a name fact (via a logic
query) from a logic set at each step, and synthesize a token
to fetch the logic set for the next step, followed by a final
query to validate the pathname. It also demonstrates the cost
of script processing and the benefits of caching when the
client resolves many names. We build a synthetic naming
tree with 1024 pathnames (height 5, branching factor 4).
The test harness sends a sequence of queries on the 1024
leaf names. Figure 9 shows the latencies of these sequential
lookups: queries beyond 1024 are repeats that resolve from
the cache, with all costs due to processing the scripts and
logic.
This example also illustrates the benefits of combining
logic with a scripting layer: no name server is needed, since
all name entries reside in the certificate store and are au-
thenticated by their issuers. Table 5 shows the breakdown
of processing costs to create names (via post) and perform
lookups. The post results show the costs to sign/issue certifi-
cates and post them to the store, and the scripting costs.
Multi-indexed facts. In some cases, the desired order of
parameters is not unique due to different types of queries.
For example, in an AWS-IAM environment powered by
STRONG, a guard checks whether a subject can have ac-
cess to a named object. Clients attach policies (e.g., ACLs)
to an owned directory which apply to all objects with names
matching the pathname prefix of the directory. The service
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Figure 10: Cost of access compliance checks in an IAM-like environ-
ment enabled by STRONG. The subject of a query is an immediate
member of a group that is authorized to access a directory containing
the target object. We vary the chain length of name entry delegation be-
tween the containing directory and the target object and compare the
inference time with single secondary index and with double secondary
indices on name delegation.
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Figure 11: Latency of routing verification under three query work-
load models: routes with the same origins, routes randomly selected,
and routes received by the same ASes.
may need to search up the name delegation chain for cer-
tified evaluation of object pathnames (to validate resolved
pathnames) or down the chain for prefix access checks (to
check if the target object is under an accessible directory).
The STRONG trust script issues two facts in the logic set
for each delegation, using different predicates: they have the
same meaning, but different parameter orders. Each policy
rule uses the predicate with the most effective indexing for
its query. Figure 10 shows the difference of inference time
with single secondary index and with double secondary in-
dices.
Routing and IP delegation. We examine the efficiency
of queries in the Routing application under a synthetic sce-
nario (Figure 11). AS principals exchange information on
routing and IP prefix assignment/delegation in the same way
as in BGP and RPKI. A guard checks whether an advertised
path is valid by verifying route delegation at each hop and IP
prefix ownership of the origin. We split the IP address space
into 32K prefixes and delegate those prefixes from an (RPKI)
trust anchor to 32K ASes. The branching factor of the del-
egation tree is 8 and the depth is 5. We generated a random
network topology of those ASes, and ASes choose the short-
est path to propagate routes. The average path length is 6.9.
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Figure 12: Inference time as a function of image property list. SAFE
inference engine iterates through all properties associated with the
image. The inference cost increases almost linearly with the length of
image property list. The length of ACL list of the target object is 2000.
Figure 11 shows the latency distribution for a single
SAFE engine to bulk-validate all routes with the same ori-
gin, routes received by a given AS, and a random set of
routes. This example illustrates a limitation of SAFE’s link-
ing and “pull-based” approach, which is not suitable in all
cases. Pulling and caching help to validate random routes
and for routes with the same origin. However, in BGPSEC
each node (e.g., a router or host) must validate the routes
that it receives, and each route advertisement is specific to
the advertiser and the destination prefix. Thus a node con-
siders each certificate exactly once, and its set cache yields
no value. Moreover, “pulling” certificates on demand incurs
fetch costs, while the conventional approach of “pushing”
supporting certificates with each advertisement has the de-
sired effect of leaving each node with exactly the certificates
it needs, just when it needs them. Each certificate is needed
by all successors in its path, but never by any other node.
This is the worst case for SAFE’s pull-based approach.
Attestation-based access control. In attestation-based
access control, a guard checks whether the code (image) run-
ning on a client can access a given object, based on an ob-
ject ACL that lists properties of permitted image. The trust
policy permits the access if the client is attested (e.g., by a
trusted cloud provider) to be running a given image, and the
image is endorsed as having a permitted property (e.g., by a
trusted certification authority). In this experiment, the target
object has 2000 entries of image properties in its ACL and
the number of properties the image of the requesting client
has varies from 50 to 450. Figure 12 shows performance for
guard queries for attestation-based access control. The in-
ference engine iterates through all image properties and the
secondary index ensures checking whether a given property
is on the ACL list completes in constant time. As a result,
the inference time increases almost linearly to the length of
the image property list.
Processing cost of Slang programming patterns. We
use attestation-based access control to explore the cost of
scripting in difference programming patterns. In this exper-
iment, the requesting client has 5 properties on its image
and the target object has 7 entries of image properties in its
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Figure 13: Comparison of execution time of logical inference and
end-to-end slang processing under three common slang programming
patterns.
ACL. We wrote slang script for the guard with three differ-
ent patterns: single context with BearerRef, single context
with synthesized context token, and multiple contexts. As
shown in Figure 13, the inference costs among these three
patterns are close, because the underlying logic queries and
statements are the same. The script using single context with
BearerRef is the most efficient as the server need neither
synthesize tokens nor assemble multiple proof sub-contexts.
At the same time, the scripting cost is still moderate with
each pattern. In practice, a developer can balance between
programming efficiency and scripting overhead to choose a
suitable pattern.
7. Related Work
Trust logic. SAFE builds on trust logic, but its contribu-
tions (scripted linking) are independent of the trust logic in
use. SAFE could use any declarative language that supports
trust delegation among concretely named principals: §8.1
discusses background and alternatives. We advocate use of
Datalog as the most powerful logic that is tractable. One role
of this paper is to demonstrate its practicality for a range of
examples. Although we do not expect existing systems (e.g.,
DNSSEC or BGPSEC) to be reimplemented using logic, the
examples show that logic can be a powerful basis for future
multi-domain systems.
Our SAFE prototype uses a Datalog-with-says trust logic
equivalent to Binder [16]. SD3 [21] and SENDLog [2, 38]
also use Datalog-with-says: our naming and routing applica-
tions are based on examples developed in these prior works.
These languages add new features for distributed coordina-
tion within the logic. In contrast, SAFE uses pure Datalog
within a larger framework to organize and share logic con-
tent in a networked system based on the novel abstraction of
linked logic sets.
Credential discovery and PCA. Logical trust systems
enable flexible declarative policies, but do not in themselves
address the credential discovery problem—identifying and
obtaining the credentials needed by a policy in a distributed
setting. Many previous works simply assume that a caller
identifies the correct credentials and passes them by value in
each request, which may force the receiver/authorizer to pro-
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cess them even if it has already received them for a previous
request. SAFE avoids this cost using caching and pass-by-
reference of linked certificates named by secure links. Proof-
Carrying Authorization (PCA [7]) goes further in requiring
the caller to complete the proof itself. We show that linked
certificates with delegation-based context pruning can yield
proof costs low enough to avoid this burden.
In other approaches to credential discovery the prover is-
sues distributed queries as it runs (e.g., [6, 15, 29]). In con-
trast, SAFE indexes and retrieves certificates by hashed pa-
rameterized string labels in scripting outside the logic layer,
enabling the prover to run without blocking. It supports re-
trieval of linked DAG closures for explicit delegations, and
precise and flexible queries from the shared store when label
parameters are known. We show that these features address
credential discovery in a simple and uniform way, clearing
the way for practical use of trust logic for many applications.
Certificate storage in a DHT. SAFE facilitates certifi-
cate sharing via a key-value store model (e.g., a DHT),
which can be highly available and scalable. The early X.500
model proposed a distributed certificate repository, as dis-
cussed by the SPKI/SDSI authors [17], who judge it to be
impractical. A key difference is that SAFE certificates are
indexed by hashed links: like SPKI/SDSI they do not require
coordinated global principal names, which are instead built
at a higher layer. Many DHT applications have stored self-
certifying content by hashes in a similar way (see [13]).
Conchord [3] introduced the use of a DHT as a shared
store for logical certificates. Conchord preserves closure un-
der inference for stored certificates: insertions trigger recur-
sive rounds of retrievals and new insertions of newly deriv-
able facts. Conchord’s insertion algorithm is specific to the
limited representational power of SDSI, and does not gen-
eralize to Datalog, which is a more powerful logic. CERT-
DIST [34, 35] follows the query model of certificate discov-
ery; it uses a DHT as a cache, but leaves programmers to de-
cide how to index certificates, e.g., by hashing selected fields
to assign the keys. In contrast, SAFE offers a simple and uni-
form linking model outside of the logic layer, which enables
simple indexing of the DHT and local caches, and serves the
needs of key applications. It also generalizes certificate link-
ing within the DHT in a novel way. Note that SAFE’s linking
at the set/certificate level is distinct from SDSI’s “linked lo-
cal names”: these exist at the logic level and are subsumed
by Datalog [26], which SAFE also uses.
CoDoNS [31] proposes a DHT to store signed DNSSEC
name records, and shows that it can improve DNS lookup
behavior. We show how to use this approach within SAFE to
support multi-rooted hierarchical naming. SAFE’s scripting
layer supports name lookup by indexing each name compo-
nent with a link (§4), followed by an end-to-end logical val-
idation check similar to the certified evaluation of SD3 [21].
8. Discussion
8.1 Toward a Standard Trust Logic
Many works have developed languages for managing trust
and access control. Any such language reduces to a logic if
it is rigorously defined. For example, it is now understood
that XACML access control—now common in industry—is
equivalent in power to Datalog. Its uptake suggests that the
expressive power of logic has value in enterprise information
systems and other settings in which XACML is used.
Logical trust systems are often called Logic-Based Au-
thorization (LBA, e.g., Nexus/NAL [33, 36]); Proof-Carrying
Authorization (PCA [7]) is also logic-based. LBA is a pow-
erful building block for secure networked systems. Appli-
cations of LBA include tag-based file access [30], building
controls [5], software trust with logical attestation [33], and
Internet infrastructures including DNSSEC [21] and secure
routing [2].
We advocate Datalog-with-says as a practical standard
for network trust logic. Off-the-shelf logic engines (e.g., the
Styla engine used in our prototype) offer a standard syntax
for the trust logic says operator within Datalog. Briefly,
any predicate symbol may be qualified with a “:” operator
and a namespace value (a string). The namespace acts as
syntactic sugar for a “hidden” first (prefix) parameter of
the predicate. Li [25] reduces Datalog-with-says to Datalog
using an implicit prefix parameter for each predicate and
atom in a similar way.
In this way Datalog can represent precise restricted dele-
gations using says and inference. In particular, a statement
about a principal naturally represents a delegation or en-
dorsement that is restricted by the speaker and predicate. An
authorizer accepts the delegation only if it has a matching
rule in its trust policy that trusts the speaker as a source for
the specific predicate and parameters. The speaker of a goal
atom in a rule may be a variable; quantifying over principals
in this way enables attribute-based delegation [27], a useful
feature that bases acceptance of a statement on what other
principals say about its speaker.
Classical authorization logic (ABLP [1, 23] and its suc-
cessors [19, 33]) also rely on says as a cornerstone, but in-
troduce a second-order operator (speaksFor) as the basis for
delegation. These logics are expressive, with a rich notion of
compound principals, but are intractable and therefore unap-
pealing for practical use. In contrast, Datalog can represent
precise restricted delegations using says and inference, with-
out speaksFor.
Since Datalog with ordered domains is P-complete [20],
Datalog-with-says is the maximally expressive tractable
trust logic. Some early trust logics are less powerful and lack
essential features. SPKI/SDSI [15, 17] and role-based trust
(RT0 [28]) can represent rich naming and access control,
but are weaker than Datalog [25, 26]. ; for example, RT0
roles have no parameters, and SPKI/SDSI also lacks con-
junctive policy rules. Li et al. show that SPKI/SDSI naming
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reduces to RT0 role-based trust [26], and that RT0 reduces
to Datalog [25].
Other trust logics are merely syntactic variants of Dat-
alog [8, 24], or like classical authorization logics are in-
tractable. For example, FLANC [18]—recently proposed as
a logic for authorizing network control in Software-Defined
Exchanges (SDX)—is based on NAL [33, 36], which is un-
decidable. FLANC adds integer (flowspace) ranges to NAL,
but these are already present in Datalog [25], and we illus-
trate their use in SAFE for secure routing.
8.2 Certificate Infrastructure
Using certificates with a decentralized key-value store (e.g.,
SafeSets) can be scalable, reliable, and secure (e.g., see [13]).
For our use, the store must extend conventional K/V stores
and DHTs to add write authorization (§5): neither clients nor
SafeSets servers are trusted. We discuss issues with use of
K/V stores or DHTs in this setting.
Alternatives. Note first that our approach is compatible
with other options for handling logic content. Sets could be
store and authenticated in other ways, e.g., in secure web di-
rectories maintained for the owning principals, or unsigned
in a trusted metadata service for use within a single domain.
This would require a different implementation of links, but
certificates and even signing are no longer required. Trust
logic and SAFE’s scripted linking assume only that prin-
cipals are authenticated to unique names: our use of pub-
lic keys with hashing and signing meets this need, but they
are not essential. Some settings may reduce cost by avoid-
ing asymmetric crypto and authenticating principals by other
means (e.g., Web single-sign on). Because slang abstracts set
post/fetch, the certificate infrastructure is a replaceable ele-
ment of SAFE.
Revocation, renewal, and key rotation. In any case,
linking with on-demand fetch can assist with perennial prob-
lems for credential management. For example, an issuer may
modify a certificate in SafeSets at any time, e.g., to renew it
or revoke it. The caches use TTL consistency, so an autho-
rizer may continue to use stale certificates until they expire.
The expiration time is under control of the issuer, and an au-
thorizer may pull/poll for a fresh copy at any time, as SAFE
does when a logic query fails. A renewed certificate is auto-
matically refreshed when it expires. Key rotation is more dif-
ficult because reissuing a certificate under a new key changes
its token/link: any certificate that links to it must also be reis-
sued (one hop).
Integrity. If a SafeSets server is subverted it can only
deny service or leak data: it cannot forge certificates. A
faulty server may hide updates or allow content to be over-
written: servers may be held strongly accountable (in the
sense of CATS [37]) for such misbehavior.
Confidentiality. A faulty server may monitor access pat-
terns or leak certificates without detection: we leave these
issues to future work. A curious client may read any con-
tent for which it can synthesize the token (§3. It is easy to
protect content by salting the label—which makes the token
“unguessable”—but this also limits the ability of a peer to
query for the certificate with a synthesized token, unless the
issuer passes the salt to trusted peers out of band. Leaked
tokens do not compromise integrity: it is not the token it-
self that confers privilege, but the authenticated statements
contained in the logic set that it references.
Malicious content. Issuers may issue malformed certifi-
cates or generate malformed DAGs, e.g., by creating cycles
in the DAG. The fetch procedure rejects malformed certifi-
cates and detects and ignores cycles. Valid certificates con-
tain only logic statements, which share the safety properties
of pure Datalog: all queries terminate and are sound with re-
spect to trust policy rules, which identify and ignore any un-
trusted statements. However, issuers may create very large
or costly logic sets to mount a denial of service attack. To
defend against such attacks, authorizer may bound the size
of incoming logic sets and query contexts at its discretion,
and/or throttle its fetches.
Reclamation. Stored logic content may accumulate over
time. SafeSets may delete any certificate after it expires.
Even so, issuers may use unreasonable expiration times or
simply post useless data to the store. SafeSets authenticates
each issuer by its public key, but quotas are of no help if an
issuer can mint new keys at will. One option is to apply a
more stringent access check for posting (e.g., using SAFE).
9. Conclusion
Certificate linking resolves the credential discovery problem
to enable practical use of trust logic in complex applica-
tion scenarios. Scripted linking allows developers to gener-
ate small, efficient proof contexts with linear inference cost,
given suitable indexing. Links enable fetching and caching
of certificates on demand from a K/V store, which is in-
herently scalable. The primary metric for scalability then is
the throughput at which any given participant can process
logic queries, e.g., for access control decisions, given the
complexity of the application’s trust policies and certificate
structures. The results show that linking enables efficient
contexts via delegation-driven context pruning, enabling a
logic server to issue queries against selected context sets at
high throughput.
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